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SUMMARY 
Obfuscation, uncertainty and opacity. These are just a few of the words that may
be used to describe the judiciary’s attempt at producing a consistent and accurate
identification of employment status of individuals. Given its significance, one
may have considered that definitive instruction and guidance would be present to
navigate interested parties. However, where clarity is required, only confusion
remains. This is not to lay the blame at the door of the judiciary entirely. The ‘mix
of law and fact’ involved in the identification process incorporates facts in each
case which will invariably lead to contradictory decisions, but the underlying
principles established in law – created by the judiciary in the absence of any
specific and meaningful guidance from the legislation, must offer key criteria on
which impartial decisions as to the employment status of an individual can be
made. This paper attempts to identify those key criteria present in the judgments
indicative of employee status and thereby provide instruction for interested
parties.
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1. INTRODUCTION
The aim of this paper is to identify key features developed by the judiciary in the
continuing battle of effectively determining the employment status of individuals.
Whilst various statutes have provided definitions of employment status – as
employees; independent contractors; and workers – these are intentionally broad.
(1) Tribunals, which hear the evidence and have the opportunity to question the
true relationship between the parties, are best placed to identify the employment
status of an individual. However, given that tribunals do not establish precedent,
conflicting decisions and interpretations of law are prevalent. Identifying the key
criteria in the accurate identification of employment status is essential for the
individuals and their employers, given the significance for the rights and
obligations it places on both parties. (2)
2. EMPLOYMENT RIGHTS PER STATUS
To begin, it is important to recognise the rights to which individuals with the
various forms of employment status have access. A list is provided here to quickly
demonstrate why individuals who may have been wrongly (whether this is
innocent, negligent, or through deliberate (3) means) defined as ‘independent
contractor’ or ‘worker’ may be denied access to some of the most important rights
held at work.
The protective employment rights applicable to employees (defined in the
Employment Rights Act (ERA) 1996 s. 230(1)) are the most extensive and include
the right to:
Unfair dismissal; (4)
Redundancy; (5)
A written statement of particulars of employment; (6)
Request to work flexibly; (7)
Maternity leave (8) / adoption leave (9) / paternity leave (10) – and
associated pay; (11)
Protection through an employer’s insurance scheme; (12)
Employer’s vicarious liability for torts committed in the course of
employment; (13)
Time off to perform public duties; (14) and
All of the rights enjoyed by workers as outlined below.
Workers (defined in the ERA 1996 s. 230(3)), by comparison, have the following
rights:
Rights not to be discriminated (15) against and to equal pay (16) through the
Equality Act 2010;
Right not to suffer a detriment on the grounds related to union membership
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or activities / non-membership of a trade union; (17)
Maternity, paternity and adoption pay (but not leave);
To the national minimum wage; (18)
Paid holiday leave (19) and rest breaks; (20)
Statutory sick pay; (21)
Protection against a detriment due to a worker making a protected
disclosures (whistleblowing); (22)
Rights to be automatically enrolled in a pension scheme; (23)
Rights not to be treated less favourably where the individual works part-
time; (24) and
Protection of health and safety. (25)
The genuinely self-employed have the following rights:
Right not to be discriminated against through membership / non-
membership of a trade union; (26) and
Protection under the Health and Safety at Work etc Act 1974.
A further group of individuals have been provided rights (or had existing
rights extended), following action from the European Union in Directive
2008/104/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19
November 2008 on Temporary Agency Work (OJ L/327/9) which led to the
enactment of the Agency Worker Directive and Regulations 2010 (SI
2010/93). The Regulations provide (qualifying) agency workers rights to:
Paid holiday leave and rest breaks (Working Time Regulations Act 1998);
The National Minimum Wage Act 1998;
Statutory sick pay;
Not to be discriminated against and to equal pay through the Equality Act
2010;
Protection under the Health and Safety at Work etc Act 1974; and
Maternity, paternity and adoption pay (but not leave).
Whilst the above do not contain exhaustive lists, they are used to illustrate the
reason why employment status is so important to the protection afforded
individuals at work. Seemingly, available rights decrease as an individual moves
from status as an employee (at the top tier of rights) to worker, and then to
independent contractor (the genuinely self-employed). It also explains why many
employers may attempt to label an individual (sometimes dishonestly or falsely)
as self-employed when they may in reality have the characteristics of an
employee.
As an academic exercise, examination of the awards provided by tribunals and
extracting key intrinsic and extrinsic features is interesting, challenging and
illuminating. For businesses, such an approach is not merely unhelpful but may
prove financially debilitating. Effective management of a business is often
predicated on operational cost analysis and business planning (Dunlap 2009). Part
of this involves determining who is responsible for National Insurance
contributions, the extent of potential liability for tortious acts committed in the
course of employment, identifying exposure to claims of unfair dismissal (27] and
redundancy, (28) and identifying an employer and buyer’s responsibilities and
liabilities when an undertaking is transferred. (29)
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Delineating the often confusing and contradictory application of the common law
rules is vital for employers in their effective business planning (30) and managing
costs. (31) There also exist potential concerns for the individual, beyond the
employment rights to which he/she may have access, when status as an
employee (and the certainty this status provides) is not clear. Employment status
(including the self-employed and employee dimension), and unemployment have
been examined on the basis of direct linkages between such status and an
employee's self-rated health (Kaleta et al 2008). This method of assessing a
person's health focuses not simply on somatic health, but considers a much
broader concept of general well-being, motivation and perceived health. This is an
important aspect of health care, incorporating biological, psychological and social
dimensions (Miilunpalo et al 1997). Further, Kaleta et al consider that such forms
of '... subjective assessments of general health could be even more sensitive in
health monitoring than external measures of health.' (at p. 227).
Before an examination of the tests used to determine employment status is
performed, it is important to recognise the influence which the European Union
and the Court of Justice of the European Union (Court of Justice) have had on
extending employment rights and determining employment status.
3. THE INFLUENCE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION
The UK’s membership of the European Union has not only been a major force in
initiating many protective employment rights, but has also broadened (and
consulted in areas for the extension of) the protection of rights to ‘workers,’ not
just those with ‘employee’ status. Rights such as the Working Time Regulations
1998; the National Minimum Wage Act 1998; (32) and the Part-time Workers
(Prevention of Less Favourable Treatment) Regulations 2000 are applicable to
workers who undertake to perform the work personally. Further, the
concept/identification of ‘worker’ has also been the jurisdiction of the Court of
Justice of the European Union, in relation to the interpretation of the parent laws
and rights regarding free movement, rather than for the domestic courts and
tribunals of the Member States (C66/85 Lawrie-Blum v Land Baden-Wurttemberg
[1986] ECR 2121). The EU has identified the definition of worker as someone who
undertakes ‘genuine and effective work’ (compare Case 196/87 Steymann v
Staatsecretaris van Justitie [1988] ECR 6159 and Case 344/87 Bettray v Staatsecrataris
van Justitie [1989] ECR 1621); (33) it does not take into account the motives of the
individual for undertaking work (Case 53/81 Levin v Staatssecretaris van Justitie
[1982] ECR 1035); and ‘workers’ may include those individuals who work part-
time (Case 139/85 Kempf v Staatssecretaris van Justitie [1987] 1 CMLR 764). (34)
More recently, in Case C-14/09 Hava Genc v Land Berlin [2010] ECR I-00931 the
Court of Justice determined that Member States may not give a restrictive
interpretation of the concept. Also, and perhaps most significantly for the
purposes of this paper, is where the Court defined a worker thus: ‘The essential
feature of an employment relationship is (where)… a person performs services for
and under the direction of another person in return for which he receives
remuneration’ (at para 19). This brings with it the concepts of personal service,
pay and control which are mirrored in the domestic judicial mechanism of
identification of an employee.
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The UK’s membership of the EU has been the instigation of (arguably) the most
important employment rights. A short sample, as way as an example of its
impact, demonstrates the EU Directives which have been transposed into
domestic law, giving rights to people at work:
Council Directive 75/117/EEC of 10 February 1975 on the approximation of
the laws of the Member States relating to the application of the principle of
equal pay for men and women;
Council Directive 76/207/EEC of 9 February 1976 on the implementation of
the principle of equal treatment for men and women as regards access to
employment, vocational training and promotion, and working conditions;
Council Directive 86/378/EEC of 24 July 1986 on the implementation of the
principle of equal treatment for men and women in occupational social
security schemes;
Council Directive 92/85/EEC of 19 October 1992 on the introduction of
measures to encourage improvements in the safety and health at work of
pregnant workers and workers who have recently given birth or are
breastfeeding (tenth individual Directive within the meaning of Article 16
(1) of Directive 89/391/EEC);
Directive 2009/38/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6
May 2009 on the establishment of a European Works Council or a procedure
in Community-scale undertakings and Community-scale groups of
undertakings for the purposes of informing and consulting employees
[Official Journal L 122 of 16.5.2009];
Council Directive 2001/23/EC of 12 March 2001 on the approximation of
the laws of the Member States relating to the safeguarding of employees'
rights in the event of transfers of undertakings, businesses or parts of
undertakings or businesses;
Council Directive 2002/14/EC of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 11 March 2002 establishing a general framework for informing
and consulting employees in the European Community - Joint declaration
of the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission on employee
representation;
Council Directive 2003/88/EC of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 4 November 2003 concerning certain aspects of the organisation
of working time.
The Court of Justice has also been active in determining the interpretation and
extent of employment rights. It recently considered the rights of workers’ access
to their annual leave, as provided through Directive 2003/88/EC (the Working
Time Directive). The Court of Justice held, in Case C-78/11 ANGED v FASGA
[2012] IRLR 779, that where a worker could not access his/her annual leave
accrued during the year of employment (due to the worker’s illness), an employer
may not replace this period of leave by payment in lieu unless the contract of
employment had been terminated. The Court of Justice considered that when
interpreting Directive 2003/88/EC it had to be remembered that annual leave and
sick leave are intended to serve different purposes. A period of illness requiring
leave is necessary for the recovery to health of the individual. It does not allow
the individual to benefit from the rest and recuperation that the Working Time
Directive’s annual leave provisions are intended to provide.
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The Court of Justice has (consistently) interpreted EU laws often in their broadest
sense to offer protection to individuals’ employment rights. (35) Also the EU,
being the source of many employment rights, has required these rights be given
to ‘workers’ so as to avoid the requirement for ‘employee’ status. (36) These rights
have focused on principles of anti-discrimination and health and safety, which are
evidently of great importance in social policy, but it remains that two of the most
commonly cited reasons for tribunal claims and offering protection against abuses
of managerial prerogative (unfair dismissal and redundancy) are the two which
still require status as an ‘employee.’
Despite the intervention of the EU, the domestic interpretation of employment
status continues to be of supreme importance and the paper now addresses the
statutory and common law approaches to establishing a working definition.
4. STATUTORY DEFINITION
The Employment Rights Act (ERA) 1996 s. 230 provides the statutory definition of
employment status for most employment rights. It reads:
1. “employee” means an individual who has entered into or works under (or,
where the employment has ceased, worked under) a contract of
employment.
2. “contract of employment” means a contract of service or apprenticeship,
whether express or implied, and (if it is express) whether oral or in writing.
3. “worker” (except in the phrases “shop worker” and “betting worker”)
means an individual who has entered into or works under (or, where the
employment has ceased, worked under)—
a. a contract of employment, or
b. any other contract, whether express or implied and (if it is express)
whether oral or in writing, whereby the individual undertakes to do
or perform personally any work or services for another party to the
contract whose status is not by virtue of the contract that of a client
or customer of any profession or business undertaking carried on by
the individual;
and any reference to a worker’s contract shall be construed accordingly.
5. “employer”, in relation to an employee or a worker, means the person by
whom the employee or worker is (or, where the employment has ceased,
was) employed.
It is evident that there exist three types of employment under which an individual
may be engaged - ‘employee’; ‘independent contractor’; and ‘worker’. This
statutory definition is broad and has provided the necessary discretion for the
judiciary to advance the law in light of the developing societal, policy and
employment changes in such relationships.
Similar definitions of employment to that in the ERA 1996 exist in the Trade
Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992 s. 295(1) and the Equality
Act 2010 s. 83(2). What is particularly interesting is that statutory intervention has
been sparse at best, unhelpful in practice, and it rests with the common law, with
its own advantages but limitations, to fill in the substantial gaps of a workable
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definition and test of employment status. It seems only the issue of tax has led to
meaningful consultation on the subject (Her Majesty’s Revenue & Customs: False
Self-employment in Construction: Taxation of Workers, July 2009). Employment
rights are seemingly of lesser importance.
Davies (2009) accurately identifies the significance of the definition in ERA 1996 s.
230 in that it establishes the contract of employment as a ‘common law concept’
(at p. 86) which has resulted in greater litigation ‘… as individuals strive to get
into a more protected category and employers seek to avoid the legal obligations
that would follow from this.’ (at p. 91).
5. EMPLOYMENT STATUS: A JUDICIAL ODYSSEY
Servants, workers, employees, independent contractors, workers on the lump,
agency staff, the list continues, and it continues to grow. (37) It is exactly the
nature of labour and how working patterns and relationships have developed
that has caused difficulties in establishing a clear definition of employment status.
This diversity of relations, with atypical forms of working becoming ever more
typical, (38) and new forms of business structures with agency work and bi-
lateral, trilateral and even quadrilateral relationships coming to the attention of
the courts (Evans v Parasol and another [2009] UKEAT 0536/08/2307), has made
establishing clear rules even more problematic.
The courts have traversed many forms of employment, facts, arguments, policies,
and government instructions, and in so doing they have attempted to revise and
refine tests that assist courts and the parties (39) in more effectively determining
employment status. As a very brief outline, the main tests developed by the
courts can be summarized as follows.
The control test began the common law’s search for effective determination of
employment status. This sought to identify the existence of an employer’s right to
control the individual to such a degree to make the individual the servant of the
master (Yewens v Noakes (1880) 6 QBD 530). It was effective when the relationship
existed between the servant and his master, the master told the servant what to do
and the servant did it. The consequences for refusal were harsh and therefore
establishing the imposition of the vicarious liability of the employer in this respect
was relatively easy. Problems soon emerged with using this test in isolation – not
just in this jurisdiction but also in the United States where inconsistent decisions
were also commonplace. (40) The advent of a new breed of ‘skilled workers’ who
by their nature exhibited a greater degree of independence than their ‘servant’
predecessors required a more critical and surgical test. This point was made by
Kahn-Freund (1951) where he observed ‘To say of a captain of a ship, the pilot of
an aeroplane, the driver of a railway engine, of a motor vehicle, or of a crane that
the employer “controls” (41) the performance of his work is unrealistic and almost
grotesque.’ (at p. 506).
The control test evolved to the employer’s right to control the activities of the
individual. Where the employment relationship was based on the employer
determining key elements such as when a surgeon worked (Cassidy v Ministry of
Health [1951] 2 KB 343 CA), and when a professional football player trained
(Walker v Crystal Palace FC [1910] 1 KB 87), this enabled a determination of the
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employer instructing the individual as to when and where the job was to be
completed, whilst recognizing their increasing level of skill, and hence removal
from the direct control of the employer. The employer maintained control over the
individual’s actions, but this became control over the individual’s hours and place
of work, in which order he would undertake those responsibilities, rather than the
direct control such as how to complete the job, that had previously existed.
The organization test had been mooted in Cassidy v Ministry of Health by the three
judges – Somervell, Singleton and Denning LJJ whereby consideration of the part
played by the individual in the employer’s organization was more suitable and
accurate rather than questioning whether the individual was subject to the
employer’s orders in doing the work. Denning further developed the test in
Stevenson Jordan & Harrison Ltd v Macdonald and Evans [1952] 1 TLR 101. The case
involved whether Evans was an employee or independent contractor for the
purposes of ownership of intellectual property rights. Denning considered that an
employee was integrated into an organization.  His judgment was conceptually
correct and accurate but the problem arose in how to apply it practically.
Employees were considered by Denning to be ‘part and parcel’ of an organization,
whilst a contractor found him/herself on the periphery. It is undeniable that
employees have a strong relationship with the employer, underlined by implied
terms such as to maintain trust and confidence and the relationship goes beyond
the commercial / transactional. Independent contractors, on the other hand, are
seen as entering a commercial arrangement. They enjoy tax benefits and can
maximize earnings, but run the risk of financial losses on the insolvency of an
employer (as an unsecured creditor) or if they work without having the required
compulsory and personal insurance in place.
The organization test was seen by some as more favourable than the control test.
Kahn-Freund (1951) had criticized the control test as being vague, and though
‘control’ adopted a common sense approach, it would necessitate and make
everything dependent on whether an ‘ordinary person’ (42) would consider the
contract one of service. However, as Kahn-Freund continues:
“Such common sense tests are sometimes the response of the Courts
to situations in which “harder” criteria have been overtaken by
events. They have a way of collapsing in marginal cases and of
leading to a maze of casuistry without much principle.” (at p. 507).
It was, however, also subject to criticism by academic commentators (Burchell et
al. 1999) (43) and by the judiciary. (44)
This led us to the 1960s. The judiciary began to identify more sophisticated tests
in recognition of the increasing complexity and diversity of an educated,
professional workforce. Further, skilled individuals would often work far from
the employer’s direct control, worked under their own autonomy and the
previous tests were lacking in depth to enable the true relationship to be
determined. (45) This led to the most significant case, the modern test applied
consistently - Ready-Mixed Concrete (South East) Ltd v Minister of Pensions and
National Insurance [1968] 2 QB 497. Following a question as to whom was
responsible for the payment of tax and National Insurance contributions of so-
called ‘owner drivers’, the court established the following three questions (at p.
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499) to be answered:
The servant agrees that, in consideration of a wage or other remuneration,
he will provide his own work and skill in the performance of some service
for his master;
He agrees, expressly or impliedly, that in the performance of that service he
will be subject to the other's control in a sufficient degree to make that other
master; and
The other provisions of the contract are consistent with its being a contract
of service.
The first of the three tests identified in Ready-Mixed Concrete is the requirement for
mutuality of obligations between the parties. As later confirmed in Montgomery v
Johnson Underwood [2001] EWCA Civ 318, [2001] ICR 819, this test, along with the
existence of an element of control exercisable by the employer, are essential to
status as an employee and must be answered in the affirmative before the final
Ready-Mixed Concrete test is considered: ‘... mutuality of obligation and the
requirement of control on the part of the potential employer are the irreducible
minimum for the existence of a contract of employment’ (per Longmore LJ, para
46). But as identified by Deakin and Morris (2009) ‘... mutuality of obligation is a
feature not just of contracts of employment, but also of contracts for the supply of
personal services; it cannot therefore function as an indicator of employee status.’
Indeed, when comparing O'Kelly v Trusthouse Forte plc [1983] ICR 728 (where
regular casuals were held as independent contractors due to a lack of mutuality)
and Nethermere (St Neots) Ltd v Gardiner [1984] ICR 612 (where home workers
were held as employees due to the existence of mutuality), the problems inherent
with the application of the test are evident. (46) Indeed, Freedland (2003) and
Davies (2009) have both observed that mutuality in isolation is insufficient and
what is required is a second tier of obligation established through a
global/umbrella contract. It is this second tier which proves so problematic for an
individual engaged on an atypical or casual basis to demonstrate. The courts
have, at times, considered that a protracted course of dealings between the parties
establishes a contract of employment (Nethermere (St Neots) Ltd v Gardiner), but
more often, they have reverted to the restrictive O'Kelly v Trusthouse Forte plc
interpretation (see Carmichael and Another v National Power plc [1999] 1 WLR 2042).
(47) The courts ‘... have nevertheless conceived of that irreducible minimum as
having to amount to a fixed and definite obligation, identifiable at any given
moment, upon the employing entity to offer work in future, and, symmetrically,
upon the worker to accept work as offered.’ (Freedland  (2003) p.104).
Such a definition is easily demonstrated when the parties are engaged during a
period of work, but problems soon appear when the test is applied during a
period of no work and how periods of work (over a series of
hours/days/weeks/months) may harden into periods of continuous employment
(for the purposes of ERA 1996 s. 212 - see Stephenson v Delphi Diesel Systems Ltd
[2003] ICR 471).
Following the Ready-Mixed Concrete test, the courts continued along the ‘economic
reality’ line of inquiry by attempting to establish independent contractors as being
independent of the employer and in business on their own account. The
development of the test was another venture in attempting to place some
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rationality to determine those individuals who were truly dependent on the
employer and shared reciprocal obligations compared with those individuals who
were engaged in a business relationship with the employer. In Market
Investigations v Minister of Social Security [1969] 2 QB 173 criteria that could assist
in such a distinction included ‘... whether the man performing the services
provides his own equipment, whether he hires his own helpers, what degree of
financial risk he takes, what degree of responsibility for investment and
management he has, and whether and how far he has an opportunity of profiting
from sound management in the performance of his task.’ (at p. 185).
Another issue to contend with, as raised above, is the economic reality of
mutuality of obligations. How does one differentiate between an obligation to
provide and accept work from an incentive to do so? It is surely in the interests of
the self-employed contractor to maximize his/her earnings through the
acceptance of offers of employment. It is likewise common that an employee
undertakes work because of financial need. Using such a test to establish a
reciprocal vs commercial intention on the part of the parties would be quite
difficult. Both parties - employer and individual - benefit from the work
performed by the individual and this may be a relationship that continues over a
period of time. Therefore it could satisfy the Nethermere (St Neots) Ltd v Gardiner
requirement of mutuality, but likewise fail that test and utilize the Cornwall CC v
Prater [2006] EWCA Civ 102, [2006] ICR 731 (48) line of reasoning. For employers,
certainty is once again out of reach.
Further, when looking at the spectrum of employment relationships - from
employee at one end and fully self-employed contractor at the other, it can be
difficult to apply tests such as whether the person is in business on their own
account. In an excellent review of this contentious area Leighton and Wynn (2011)
explain how an employee will bear no financial risk, and an independent
contractor will - hence the latter’s ability to benefit financially to a greater extent -
but the test becomes problematic when some genuine employees’ contractual
relationship is critiqued, such as those who are paid on commission, engaged in
the financial services industry, those employees who are paid city bonuses, those
with the label ‘consultant’ or ‘agent’ and so on. Are these individuals really
entrepreneurs in any real sense? Indeed:
“... it is, of course, between those two ends of the spectrum that have
generated most debate and case law. Many of these are employed on
intermittent work patterns, such as zero hours, stand-by, seasonal
agency work. As is known, the law has developed a number of legal
tests for employment status, each not easy to reconcile with the
other. This, in turn, has led to a high level of discretion by courts as
to which ‘test’ to apply, adding to the impression of a legal lottery.”
(Leighton and Wynn (2011) at p. 18).
Davies (2007) offers a very valuable critique of the problems in using the
mutuality of obligation test with intermittent forms of employment.
6. GLOBAL/UMBRELLA CONTRACTS
 ‘Mutuality of obligations’ was a relatively easy test to apply when the individual
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was engaged and performing work. Between ‘jobs’, it became much more difficult
to demonstrate the mutuality. The courts (49) bypassed this limitation of the test
by looking at the relationship as a whole and identifying if a series of
engagements created an overarching or ‘umbrella’ contract covering the entire
series. This was necessary, in part, because of the actions by employers to avoid
mutuality. For example, it had become a well-used tactic by employers to adopt
the form of ‘zero hours’ contracts to avoid the essential aspect of employment
status of mutuality of obligations.
There has been no shortage of judicial pronouncements of the significance of
mutuality and the dividing line between a ‘global / umbrella’ contract covering
an entirety of work completed by the individual for his/her employer (Nethermere
(St Neots) Ltd v Gardiner); and comparatively, a succession of contracts covering
each individual engagement be it a shift or period of rostered work (see O'Kelly v
Trusthouse Forte plc). These authorities have been discussed at length in the cases
noted above and by the Supreme Court in Autoclenz v Belcher [2011] UKSC 41,
[2011] ICR 1157, by the House of Lords in Carmichael and Another v National Power
plc; and by the Court of Appeal in the following: McMeechan v Secretary of State for
Employment [1997] ICR 549, Clark v Oxfordshire Health Authority [1998] IRLR 125,
and Cornwall County Council v Prater [2006] EWCA Civ 102, [2006] ICR 731.
From those cases, the judiciary had been aware of some employers’ attempts to
circumvent protective employment rights through the use of contractual terms
which sought to engage individuals on the basis of ‘zero hours’ contracts. These
were created on the understanding that there was no mutuality of obligations
between the parties. Essentially, the employer undertook no responsibility to
provide work or pay and the individual had no obligation to attend work and
could, as a consequence, take up employment with any other employer without
notice. However, examples exist where, like the veil of incorporation metaphor in
company law, the veil of the contract will be raised/pierced and the true
relationship will be investigated. One such recent example occurred in Pulse
Healthcare v Carewatch Care [2012] UKEAT/0123/12 involving care workers,
engaged under a zero hours contract, whose employment status required
clarification on the basis of a claim under the Transfer of Undertakings (Protection
of Employment) Regulations 2006 and other employment rights. Despite the
terms of the contract which provided for no mutuality of obligations, the contract
failed to reflect the true nature of the job, and how the individuals were required
to perform the work personally. The claimants worked regular hours over a
number of years, one of the claimants was suspended on full pay during the
engagement and this led the Employment Judge to comment that the ‘written
contract did not reflect the true position’ of the employment.
The approach to be adopted by Employment Tribunals was accurately summed
up by Elias J in Consistent Group Ltd v Kalwak [2007] UKEAT/0535/06, [2007] IRLR
560 at para 58:
“If the reality of the situation is that no-one seriously expects that a
worker will seek to provide a substitute, or refuse the work offered,
the fact that the contract expressly provides for these unrealistic
possibilities will not alter the true nature of the relationship. But if
these clauses genuinely reflect what might realistically be expected
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to occur, the fact that the rights conferred have not in fact been
exercised will not render the right meaningless.”
In Pulse Healthcare the finding of mutuality of obligation, the inability to provide
substitutes, and the challenging job made the employer’s assertion that these
were a series of ‘ad hoc’ discrete arrangements rather than a global contract,
incredulous. It compelled the tribunal, and later the Employment Appeal
Tribunal, to confirm that the individuals did have ‘employee’ status.
7. CONFUSION, UNCERTAINTY AND OBFUSCATION
The above tests, developed by the judiciary, painted a picture of a virtual checklist
to be applied which would, at the very least, provide a strong prima facie case of
employment status. Indeed, Her Majesty’s Revenue & Customs (HMRC),
drawing on these very tests, provides the following questions to be answered
(accompanied by an on-line tool) that claims (with the requisite disclaimers) to
demonstrate employment status:
‘As a general guide as to whether a worker is an employee or self-employed; if
the answer is 'Yes' to all of the following questions, then the worker is probably an
employee:
Do they have to do the work themselves?
Can someone tell them at any time what to do, where to carry out the work
or when and how to do it?
Can they work a set amount of hours?
Can someone move them from task to task?
Are they paid by the hour, week, or month?
Can they get overtime pay or bonus payment?
If the answer is 'Yes' to all of the following questions, it will usually mean that the
worker is self-employed:
Can they hire someone to do the work or engage helpers at their own
expense?
Do they risk their own money?
Do they provide the main items of equipment they need to do their job, not
just the small tools that many employees provide for themselves?
Do they agree to do a job for a fixed price regardless of how long the job
may take?
Can they decide what work to do, how and when to do the work and where
to provide the services?
Do they regularly work for a number of different people?
Do they have to correct unsatisfactory work in their own time and at their
own expense?’
Businesses may then use the above questions when assessing their own
employment practices and when establishing contracts of employment to identify,
with a good deal of certainty, the applicable employment status of the workforce.
(50) That would be a seemingly logical conclusion until one considers the
judgment of Nolan LJ in Hall v Lorimer [1994] 1 WLR 209:
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“In order to decide whether a person carries on business on his own
account it is necessary to consider many different aspects of that
person’s work activity. This is not a mechanical exercise of running
through items on a check list to see whether they are present in, or
absent from, a given situation. The object of the exercise is to paint a
picture from the accumulation of detail. The overall effect can only
be appreciated by standing back from the detailed picture which has
been painted, by viewing it from a distance and by making an
informed, considered, qualitative appreciation of the whole. It is a
matter of evaluation of the overall effect, which is not necessarily the
same as the sum total of the individual details. Not all details are of
equal weight or importance in any given situation. The details may
also vary in importance from one situation to another. The process
involves painting a picture in each individual case.’ (at p. 217).”
It is the detail of the relationship, the dynamic nature of such, and the accurate
delineation of the actual working relationship which can cause problems in
determination. Not only are those pertinent issues, but there is a further,
significant dimension to employment status - policy. Employment status is not an
issue determined in isolation. Any student who has journeyed through the
encompassing subject of employment status has enjoyed/endured (depending on
his/her point of view, interest and general humour) judicial commentary on the
tests and critique of legal argument, but everyone will have understood that the
topic is merely the first steps towards some wider right / obligation as the main
issue - be that the responsibility for taxation, protection against unfair dismissal, a
right to a redundancy payment and so on. Hence, employment status is NOT the
basis of these cases, it is merely a right of passage to the consideration of another
employment issue. This is not to suggest the topic is not of crucial significance - of
course it is fundamental, but the fact that it exists as a stepping stone for another
right provides an interesting dimension - what right is the individual attempting
to access? This, as several cases have demonstrated, can influence the weighting
the tribunal places on the facts of the case in relation to the reasoning in Hall v
Lorimer.
Two cases, due to the proximity of judgment and the stark difference in outcome,
have been analyzed at length to explain the rationale for the decision reached on
employment status (see Leighton 1984). Nethermere (St Neots) Ltd v Gardiner and
O'Kelly v Trusthouse Forte plc were cases which centred on the existence, or not in
the case of O’Kelly, of mutuality of obligations. The claimants in Nethermere were
females, who were working from home due to child care responsibilities, who
often had substantial periods of time where they refused work offered by the
employer, and were chosen first to be dismissed before those employees
performing their work in the employer’s factory. O’Kelly was a ‘regular casual’
waiter, who had been employed for several years and was subject to the same pay
(including tax and National Insurance contributions being taken at source),
disciplinary matters, and other terms and conditions as were full-time employees.
However, whilst Nethermere involved claimants seeking protection against an
unfair dismissal, O’Kelly wanted employee status in order to seek protection
against dismissal for his request to join a trade union. The courts differed in each
case as to the application of the ‘obligation’ dimension in mutuality - utilizing a
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narrow interpretation in O’Kelly when denying the claimants employee status, but
a broader, more inclusive approach in Nethermere. However, as O’Kelly was
decided in 1983, at the time of unrest with the militant trade union movement and
battle between the Conservative government which had won the general election
following the previous Labour government’s problems in controlling the activities
of trades unions, some commentators postulated that the decision had more of a
public policy dimension, rather than a true legal analysis and application. (51)
Whilst it is clear that employment, by its nature, does not exist in a legal vacuum
and will be affected by society and policy factors, it has led some arguments to be
presented that decisions of tribunals may be founded (or at least heavily
influenced) on this very basis.
One such example is evident in Lane v The Shire Roofing Company [1995] IRLR 493
concerning Mr Lane, a builder/roofer/carpenter who had, since 1982, traded as a
one-man firm and was registered as self-employed with the Inland Revenue. As
his work as a sole trader had diminished, and he had allowed his public liability
insurance to lapse, Lane began working for Shire Roofing. Shire Roofing was a
newly established company. It actively wanted to limit its costs and reduce
overheads (as part of its business planning initiatives) and part of this strategy
was to engage individuals as independent contractors. The agreement between
Shire Roofing and Mr Lane expressly used the label ‘independent contractor’ in
the contract. A Mr and Mrs Bird contacted Shire Roofing to quote for a re-roofing
job. Having priced the job and considered the various options of using scaffolding
or ladders, it was decided that it was most cost-effective for Lane to complete the
job using his own materials (including his ladders) rather than for Shire Roofing
to hire scaffolding. Lane began the roofing work and when Mrs Bird returned
home, she discovered Lane sat in his car, bleeding from his ears. It transpires that
in the course of carrying out this job Lane ‘fell’ from the ladders and sustained
brain damage. He wished to claim from Shire Roofing’s insurers to compensate
him for the injuries sustained, but to do so required him to possess ‘employee’
status, even though Shire Roofing had accepted that they were responsible for the
individuals’ safety at work. The Court of Appeal considered previous authorities
and the tests for employment status. What is particularly telling about the
judgment was where Henry LJ remarked ‘When it comes to the question of safety
at work, there is a real public interest in recognizing the employer/employee
relationship when it exists, because of the responsibilities that the common law
and statutes … place on the employer. (52)
Shire Roofing was arguably in breach of its health and safety obligations, and had
engaged people such as Mr Lane, as independent contractors, to circumvent such
obligations. Had the Court allowed Shire Roofing to succeed by relying on the
label in the contract, it would have enabled the employer to avoid its obligations,
and therefore it held Mr Lane to be an employee despite the label and that much
of the evidence of ‘employee’ status (such as mutuality of obligations) was
missing.
It is evident what the Court of Appeal sought to achieve in this judgment. The
policy of not allowing an employer, who controls the terms of the contract of
employment, to dictate the employment status of the individual to serve its own
ends gave it latitude in assessing the nature of the claim. Had Lane been held an
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independent contractor with no personal insurance on which to claim, the State
would have been responsible for his medical expenses, possible payment of
income support during his recovery and beyond, and it would have legitimated
the employer flouting the law and avoiding the expense of carrying appropriate
insurance.
Whilst this debate about the ability of an individual to claim from the employer's
insurance when injured at work has public policy dimensions, a further element
should also be raised. Let us change the facts of Lane slightly and postulate that
instead of the roofer being injured, what would have been the consequence had
the roofer dropped a roof tile and it had struck Mrs Bird? Had Mrs Bird been
injured, would her claim of vicarious liability been likely to succeed? It was clear
that Mr Lane had no insurance and, seemingly, an inability to satisfy a substantial
damages award. Shire Roofing would have denied responsibility for the tort as
Mr Lane was considered by it to be an independent contractor, he was a skilled
and competent roofer, the activity was not extra-hazardous, and Shire Roofing
would have relied on the argument that it was not conclusive that scaffolding
should have been used and hence it had not acted negligently.
The cases cited above are used simply to highlight the broader considerations that
have impacted on the tribunals’ decision when assessing an individual’s
employment status. Courts and tribunals may look more favorably on a claimant
who is possibly having rights removed unfairly by the sharp practice of an
employer, such as by the use of contractual terms identifying an individual as an
independent contractor. This ‘policy-dimension’ will not lead to a distortion of the
law, but it is hard to believe that such matters will not be in the considerations of a
tribunal when applying the law - and the breadth of the case law that may be
applied in any given case will surely allow the tribunal the necessary latitude to
apply whatever test enables it to reach the conclusion it chooses. Indeed this
public policy dimension has been demonstrated clearly in relation to the State’s
fear of tax avoidance measures through activities in the construction industry (53)
and in interference of freedom of contract through the application of IR35.
It can be seen that the internal system of determining employment status of
individuals has a wider, external dimension which is why better determination of
the status is so necessary. 
8. LABELLING, MISLABELLING AND PREROGATIVE
POWER
Recently, a professional advice organization (at unbiased.co.uk) estimated that
small and medium sized enterprises could have benefited from a £2 Billion tax
saving (in relation to National Insurance contributions) from moving from
engaging employees to using independent contractors, but it also recognized the
potential pitfalls in such an approach. Its recommendation was for employers to
seek professional advice (through an accountant or independent financial
adviser), but even with such an approach, it remains very difficult for an
employer to accurately and with certainty, engage an individual as an
independent contractor.
The intention of the professional advice organization is commendable,
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particularly in times of financial hardship and the government’s austerity drive
which is adversely affecting businesses, but it is fraught with dangers on both
sides. As demonstrated in Young & Woods Ltd v West [1980] IRLR 201, where the
claimant, in 1979, was dismissed when engaged under a contract, agreed by him
and the employer, which identified West as an independent contractor who was
personally responsible for payment of tax and National Insurance contributions.
West had been given the choice upon employment in 1975 to be categorized as an
employee or as a self-employed contractor (and saving him between £400-500 per
year). He chose the latter (self-employed) status, although he ostensibly
performed the same job as an employee. The Court of Appeal held, on the facts,
that he was engaged as an employee irrespective of the contract and the ‘label’
contained therein. West was compensated through unfair dismissal protection
upon the termination of his employment in 1979. Perhaps, as a cautionary tale for
both parties in the employment relationship, West’s details were sent to the (as it
then was) Inland Revenue and he was required to pay the taxes as an employee
that he should have contributed whilst engaged as an independent contractor.
Therefore the employer was subject to compensate the individual for unfairly
dismissing him, and the employee had the compensation he received for being
unfairly dismissed taken in the form of owed taxes for his incorrect employment
status.
Unlike Mr West, most individuals have very little power in the content of the
contract of employment, and the concept of choice in employment status is
largely a managerial prerogative rather than a negotiation between the parties.
(54) Levesque et al (2002) have presented arguments, based on their application of
a utility-maximising model, on the choice of employment status by individuals,
their motivations for the choice, and how their desires and attitudes toward work
influence this choice. The authors explain why individuals make choices to be an
employee or an independent contractor, but do not appear to question the
dimension of the level of 'choice' in the categorisation of the individual, whether
he/she actively determined their status, or whether they actually understood the
implications of their decision other than on a purely economic basis. Without such
an understanding, it is difficult to derive any meaningful conclusions as to the
distinction between an employee and independent contractor on the basis of their
economic desires. Further, whether he/she is in business on their own account, is,
in a practical sense, very nuanced and difficult to readily differentiate.
Labels identifying employment status cause problems and (often) confusion
between the parties. Harvey (2001) produced evidence of deliberate false-
identification of employment status in the construction industry. This, argues
Harvey, may be a result of the complexity of the legal rules accurately identifying
the status, or the distinction between employment status for the purpose of
employment rights compared with the identification for the purposes of taxation.
However, from the outset it is important to recognize that a label cannot alter the
true relationship between the parties. If the true relationship is one of employee-
employer, simply obtaining the individual’s signature on a contract which
identifies him/her as an independent contractor will fail when the relationship is
considered by the courts. The mislabelling of employment status had already
been discussed by Denning LJ in Massey v Crown Life Insurance Co [1978] 1 WLR
676 where he stated:
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“‘The law, as I see it, is this: if the true relationship of the parties is
that of master and servant under a contract of service, the parties
cannot alter the truth of that relationship by putting a different label
upon it. If they should put a different label upon it and use it as a
dishonest device to deceive the Revenue, I should have thought that
it was illegal and could not be enforced by either party and they
could not get any advantage out of it - at any rate not in any case
where they had to rely upon it as the basis of a claim: see Alexander v
Rayson (1936) 1 KB 169. An arrangement between the two parties to
put forward a dishonest description of their relationship so as to
deceive the Revenue would clearly be illegal and unenforceable. On
the other hand, if the parties' relationship is ambiguous and is
capable of being one or the other, then the parties can remove that
ambiguity by the very agreement itself which they make with one
another. The agreement itself then becomes the best material from
which to gather the true legal relationship between them. This is
clearly seen by referring back to Inland Revenue Commissioners v Duke
of Westminster (1936) AC 1.” (at p. 680).
The problems with labels have been demonstrated over many years. Indeed in
BSM Ltd v Secretary of State for Social Services [1978] ICR 894 the employer
specifically engaged the individual driving instructor as an independent
contractor, following a reorganization of the business, for the purposes of a
reduction of overheads - including the avoidance of value added tax. The driving
instructor, Mr Thorn, was held as an independent contractor as he and BSM had
entered into an agreement for the purpose of changing the employment status, as
the parties were entitled to do. The significance of BSM is of the weighting
attached to the label and what factors influenced this decision. To this point,
Warburton (1979) explains ‘Where the contract is oral the relationship between the
parties is a question of fact and the court will not interfere with the Tribunal’s
finding. If the contract is written its construction is a matter of law and only in the
latter case will the court review the Tribunal’s finding.’ (at p. 464). This is
particularly interesting given the numbers of individuals who work without a
contract of employment or having been provided with the statement of written
particulars as required by the Employment Rights Act 1996 s. 1. Where such
individuals perform their services and then are dismissed, it is necessary for the
tribunal to determine his/her employment status based on the evidence provided
by the parties. The appeal courts will not question the finding as the tribunal has
the opportunity to question the parties, ask the questions it feels necessary to
determine the true relationship, and attach whatever weightings it sees fit
according to the Hall v Lorimer line of reasoning. If this is the correct state of
affairs, it appears this situation may be more difficult and problematic to an
individual’s claim than if he/she signed an, albeit misleading, contract. At least
then the appeal courts would have the ability to consider the relationship in
greater detail and have more opportunity to challenge the tribunal’s finding.
9. CONTRACTUAL POWER AND TAXATION
It is clear that there are different rules for the purposes of finding employment
status than exist when identifying the tax liabilities of the parties (see Ferguson v
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John Dawson & Partners [1976] 1 WLR 1213 CA). For example, agency workers
may be held as employees or independent contractors (as appropriate) but for
taxation purposes, IR35 requires that such individuals are considered employees
and taxed as such. This prevents tax avoidance schemes being used by the
employer. This relates to those individuals who deliberately transfer from the
status of an employee to that of an independent contractor, for the advantages for
both the employer and individual that it brings (at least until the individual
wishes to avail him/herself of some protective employment right exclusive to
employees) whilst undertaking essentially the same duties. However, it has
become an increasingly contentious area as many employers have been warned /
become concerned with the prospect of being found to have engaged in tax
avoidance because of the tax advantages of using employees who were
masquerading as self-employed contractors.
The tax implications of employment status was also demonstrated in Autoclenz v
Belcher, although the case concerned access to National Minimum Wage Act 1999
protection and the Working Time Regulations 1998 through status of a ‘worker.’ A
group of 20 individuals had been engaged as valeters and in 2007, were asked by
the employer to sign new contracts altering the terms and conditions to the effect
that there existed no obligation for the employer to provide work, no obligation
for the individual to provide his/her services, and a right of delegation of duties
to others. The clear intention of the employer was to ensure that the individuals
could not be held as employees due to the lack of mutuality of obligations, and
the existence of a general right of substitution (where contracts of employment are
contracts of personal service and an unfettered right of substitution removes this
essential feature - Community Dental Centers Ltd v Sultan-Darman [2009]
UKEAT/0532/09). The Court of Appeal (55) referred to Gibson LJ’s judgment in
Express & Echo Publications Ltd v Tanton [1999] IRLR 367 CA where he identified
how a ‘genuine’ right of substitution (whether actually utilized or not) was
devastating to the status of an employee. However, it has been noted that the
parties may not fully understand their employment status, (56) nor readily
appreciate the implications for accepting change; (57) individuals may not realize
that they have a right not to accept change; (58) the individual may not appreciate
their right to work ‘under protest’ and preserve the right to bring a claim for
breach of contract at a later date; (59) and the courts and tribunals must appreciate
the superior bargaining power enjoyed by the employer (60) and therefore look to
‘... elaborate protestations in the contractual documents (which)... when
examined, b(a)re no practical relation to the reality of the relationship.’ (at para
104).
One of the substantial problems, witnessed by the overused ‘commercial-based
contractual’ assessment of employment relationships, has been due to cases,
particularly those which remain at the forefront of assessing employment status -
Ready-Mixed Concrete and Market Investigations - which adopt the economic reality
test. (61) Both cases established the economic reality model as an appropriate
mechanism to explain the true relationship between the parties. The ‘economic
reality test’ was developed from the American Supreme Court where, in United
States of America v Silk [1946] 331 US 704, the question asked was whether the
individuals were employees ‘as a matter of economic reality’. Having begun the
journey along this path, is it any wonder why analysis of the contract is such a
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fundamental, and possibly misconstrued, instrument to make such
determinations?
Having considered the arguments presented by the parties in Autoclenz, the
Supreme Court upheld the Court of Appeal’s judgment and found the individuals
to be workers for the purposes of the rights being claimed. Applying the tests in
Ready-Mixed Concrete, Montgomery v Johnson Underwood and Market Investigations,
the individual valeters were subject to a sufficient degree of control, they had no
right to benefit from sound management, and there was the existence of
mutuality between the parties. Similarly, in Weight Watchers (UK) Ltd v Her
Majesty’s Revenue & Customs (HMRC) [2011] UKUT 433 (TCC), [2012] STC 265, the
Upper Tribunal (Tax and Chancery Chamber) held that despite a written contract
identifying Leaders at Weight Watchers’ meetings as independent contractors, the
reality of the employment resulted in the individuals being held as employees.
The ‘substitution clause’ inserted into their contract, when viewed in light of the
Autoclenz judgment, was fettered and not a genuine right (see Bogg, 2012). The
result of the case led to Weight Watchers facing a reported, and somewhat
unpleasant, tax bill of £23 million. (62)
It would be unusual, save for some very sought-after professionals, for an
individual to have a genuine equal contracting footing with the employer. The
employer will present the contract of employment to an individual who may
either ‘take it or leave it.’ There may be some room for negotiation regarding
salary or holiday / expenses provisions etc., but generally individuals have very
little bargaining power (see Bewley and Forth 2010). This power imbalance lends
itself to abuse, largely prevented in consumer law through statutory intervention
(e.g. the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977, the Sale of Goods Act 1979 to name but
two), but is missing in employment contracts (save for abuses in health and safety
provisions etc.).
Therefore, employers may not simply rely on a written document to guarantee
employment status. Where an employer seeks to reduce overheads and seeks to
engage contractors rather than employees (as in Lane v Shire Roofing Co (Oxford)) a
tribunal may still later hold the individual to be an employee. As such, any
deficiencies in the employer’s contribution of National Insurance may be sought
by HMRC at a later date. This may be further complicated by an action, where
deemed relevant, for prosecution for tax avoidance. It is important to note that
such a situation may have been orchestrated by an employer and individual
where the employment status was genuinely a sham (compare Snook v London and
West Riding Investments Ltd [1967] 2 QB 786 (63) and Tiffin v Lester Aldridge LLP
[2012] EWCA Civ 35, [2012] 1 WLR 1887). Perhaps more commonplace is a change
to a contract made by a stronger employer to an individual in a weaker position
who may feel compelled to agree to a new contract placed in front of him/her.
The courts, as in Autoclenz, will look to the true intentions of the parties to ensure
that the real working relationship is identified, rather than a written document
which bears no relation to the true contract (that which is effective in practice).
The checklist established by government departments to assist employers and
individuals determine employment status (as demonstrated above) may be a
helpful, if broad-brush attempt at categorizing the status for employment rights
and taxation. (64) However, the reality of the relationship and the inconsistent
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case law and its application, make effective tax arrangements very difficult to
establish.
10. EMPLOYERS - A WAY FORWARD
From the information presented above it is evident that there is no easy solution
for employers. A genuine attempt to accurately reflect the status of the individual
in a contract of employment – through identification of the role performed in the
employer’s business may be insufficient to avoid misidentification. This goes
beyond negligent, careless or even deliberately misleading drafting (see Macaulay
1985).
The lack of an effective statutory definition is in practice valuable for it enables
the tribunal discretion to assimilate information and use its experience to identify
the intention of the parties and offer protection to vulnerable individuals when
necessary. Had employers been provided with a more certain statutory definition
of employment status, this would have resulted in an easier way to circumvent
employment rights than currently exists.
The consequence is that employers and individuals must look to the (albeit often
contradictory and unnecessarily complex) authorities established in the courts as
a guide. It would be largely unhelpful to offer a list of each of the questions raised
by the courts in determining employment status as many overlap or would not be
applicable in every circumstance. However, some clear instructions have been
found and this at least enables a broad consideration of the issues. As ever, the
devil is in the detail of their application and interpretation by the courts.
The tests to establish ‘employee’ status require:
An element of control exercisable by the employer sufficient to make the
employer the other’s master; and mutuality of obligations (and the
difficulties inherent in defining the appropriate measure of ‘obligation’);
then
Apply the third ‘Ready-Mixed Concrete’ test by listing consistencies and
inconsistencies of the contract being one of employment; (65) and
Explain if, and therefore how, the individual is in business on his / her own
account. (Establishing and maintaining details with the individual would
prove very beneficial in this regard). Finally,
Do not rely on HMRC’s Employment Status Indicator as anything more
than indicative. Where employment status is a serious consideration for
business planning, concentrate on the judgments on mutuality of
obligations and substitution clauses in contracts of employment. These are
increasingly the more important aspects when the courts determine
employment status.
The tests are easy to identify and explain, but once the dissection of the
relationship begins, the problems truly begin.
As a further remark, it should be recognized that tribunals undertake to hear the
evidence presented by the parties and attach the relevant weightings in reaching
its decision (per Hall v Lorimer). Appellate courts are to accept appeals where the
tribunal has concluded a case, coming to a decision that no reasonable tribunal
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would; or where the tribunal has misdirected itself as to the law. Whilst lawyers
will appreciate this role played by the appeal courts it is of concern as it provides
a vast discretion to a tribunal which can determine employment status and leave
little room for meaningful review. (66) Whilst it would be unhelpful for an
appellate court to re-examine the facts as already presented and considered in the
tribunal, what results is widely contradictory decisions based on broad common
law tests with little meaningful direction as to their application.
Finally, employers should continue to carefully draft contracts of employment
(identifying actual terms applicable to the contract, not those which are designed
primarily to attribute employment status of one kind or another to the
individual), review the working relationship regularly and adjust the written
agreement through whatever means most appropriate (e.g. a works handbook;
intranet), and ultimately, ensure that individuals engaged as independent
contractors are clearly engaged in a way that avoids mutuality and control, and
be prepared for a possible inconsistent decision depending on whether the issue is
to do with employment rights, taxation or health & safety. Unfortunately, we are
largely no further to a definitive identification of employment status than we
were 100 years ago. Indeed, it has only become more complex and confusing.
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(1) I make this statement through evidence of the inconsistent approach taken in
tribunals regarding employment status, complaints by members of the judiciary
that the tests developed through the common law have not solved the problems
inherent in offering a comprehensive test, and the inaction of Parliament to
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